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SUITS BETWEEN HUSBAID ANDf WIFE, AT COMMON
LAW, IN EQUITY AND UNDER NEW YORK STATUTES.
CHAPTER I.
Historical Sketch.
Th la o huband ~o wife
This subject, like nearly the whole of - he law of
husband and wife, is greatly affected by, and grows out
of, that somewhat peculiar doctrine of the cor.-non law-
the unity in person of husband and wife. The cornon law
lawtyers found it expressed in Littleton in these words:-
"Also, though a man may not grant, nor give his tenement
to his wife during the coverture for that he and his wife
(a)
be but one ierson in the law". Also in one or two other
passages contc cted with the law of m'eal property. For-
ever afterward when they wished a reason for some inca-
pacity of the ;ifc and one could not be found elsewhere
they applied this fiction. Nowhere, 's we have been a-
ble to find, did they attempt to give a reason for it.
Therefore ve will first examine the history of the mar-
(a) Coke's Littleton, Sec. 168, 187.
riage relation and find, if possible, the origin -and caue
for this important fiction. N
In savage life the inferior and superior positions
of iren are determined by irowess, power and endurance.
Th3 daily contest in which men meet are those requiring
great physical capacity. Her- there is an active, fiere
struf-;le for existence in which only men of power can be
of use and where women are of little or no account. Here
of necessity the position of women waild be one of degra-
dation. For in the midst of such a life all her social,
moral add delicate powers of refinement would be lost and
she 'Oaild be looked upon as a mere drudge. Consequently
the savage would regard hts wife asia chattel which he
had obtained by reason of his superior power and there-
fore his to treat as he wished, and as he would any of
his property. Again, the wife being of little use to
the savage their women would be neglected and exposed to
die. This, in time, would produce a scarcity of women
when of necessity they would prey upon the wives of hos-
tile nations. Wife capt'gre is met with in the early his-
tory of the Greeks, Romans and Hindoos. After this a-
rose a more genteel method of acquiring a wife, i.e. by
purchase. In India this was forbidden on the ground that
it was not justice for a parent to sell his child. Thus
in the evolution of the marriage relation wn find three
stares, first, wife capture, second, wife purchase,
third, religious iixrriage. The orientals, although they
treated their wives with greater respect than the western
nations, who were under an equal civilization, still re-
garded them with mistrust and suspicion. One of the
Hindoo laws was "A woman shall never go out of the house
without the consent of her husband; she shall not eat be-
fore her husband eats, nor laugh without drawing her veil
before her face." However the property rights rf women
were very just. She was given all the property that she
should acquire by inheritance, purchase, partition,
(a)
seizure and finding. But later, through the influence of
Brahminism, the rights and position of women were re-
stricted to a great extent.
In the early Roman nerriage the husband purchased
his %vife aril she became his daughter whom he treated as
he would any of his children. In fact she really passed
from the guardianship of the father to that of the hus-
(a) Maine's En-. Inst., 322..
band.p She acquired ani inherited for the profit of her
lord, and, as Gibbon says,"So clearly was woman defined
not as a person but as a thing, that if the oricin I tit6
title were defidient she might be claimed like other mov-
ables, by the use and possession for an entire ye,;r."(a)
After the Punic wars, owing to the broad views and inge-
nuity of the Roman lawyez, combined with the aspirations
of Roman women, a reform was worked. Degree by degree
were the incapacities of women removed until the third
century they were treated as favorably in law as at the
present time. She could hold property, contract and in-
herit as freely as her husband. Marriage was deemed a
partnership, into which husband and wife embarked, each
independent of the other, and which either might termi-
nate at any time. Here for the first time we find woman
free in the legal sense and having the same rightsand du-
ties with her husband.
Coming now to the English law we find that in Anglo
Saxon timesthe family seems to have been the predominat-
ing feature; although with regard to this there is some
(b)
diversity of opinion. However, in considering this sub-
(a) Gibbon's History of Rome, V'ol. 4, p. 474-477.
(b) Maine's Ancient Law, 163; Anglo Sax. Law, 122.
ject we vwill i'irst exatiine the fwmily or maegth and then
the household. In the maegth the husband and wife were
not regarded as kin to each other. The ,-ife did not be-
come one of the husband's maegth but rei:mined a member of
hr own ;nd it alone was responsible for her wrongs. The
husband did not inherit from the ,:Iife nor the wife from
the husband. Neither was the husband absolute master of
his wife, for his guardianship was subject to that of the
wife's maegth which continually watched over her and pro-
tected her person. Yet the father could not give his
daughter in marriage against her will after she had at-
(a)
tained her majority. He simply had a veto power- The
early Anglo Saxon marriage seems to h ve been a sale by
'he father to the bridegroom, and one of the laws of King
Ethelbert was "If a man carry off a maiden by force let
him pay fifty shillings to the owner and afterward buy
(b)
the object of his will M the owner." Some writers
claim that it was not a sale of the woman but of the
guardianship. First, on the ground that the r,--ice was
not fixed by the parties as in a contract but by the law
(c)
according to the r-nk of the wrman. Second, that in their
(a) Schrid. Anh., 4, Sec. 1-6.
(b) Ancient La,, of England, 25.
(c) Ethl., 75.
marriages there were two steps, viz., betrothal and nup-
tials. Now this betrothal was considered the same as
any other contract, the price being terely earnest which
the bridegroom was to lose in case he failed to peform
the contract. In time the price crme to be no longer
(a)
paid but merely promised. Which step being taken otkrs
(b)
followed and it soon carfe to be paid to the bride. The
contract now losing all appearances of being ! real con-
tract, becime binding by force of some solemn act and the
weotuma remaine] a separate gift to the end of the Anglo
Saxon period. In the Kentish betrothal there were two
gifts. "Then let tie bridegroom declare what he will
grant her if she choose hhis will and what he grant her
(c)
if she live longer th-n he." The latter was called the
morning gift, being a free gift from the husband to the
wife in case she outlived him. From these seems to hag
grown the coirnon law dower. Havinrg now examined the
marriage we will discuss the relation which it created.
The wife generally must obey her husband but in mat6
ters relating to the household she was independent. They
(a) Ine., 31; Alf., 18.
(b) Alf. Eccl. Laws, Sec. 12(cchmid. Anh., 4, Sec.3.
(c)
were co-possessors of all theproperty which the wife in-
herited, together with the mornir gift. But the hsband
could not alien without the consent of the wife nor she
without his consent. The husband might dispose of his
own property but if a specific mornin gift had been giv
em he could not alien without her consent. The proceeds
of their cornon labor belonged to the husband but -:fter
his de ,th they constituted a part of' property from whicP
her morning gift was taken. Gifts were cornon between
them. The wife's property could not be taken for the
husband's debts, nor the husband's property for the wifek
debts. Upon the death of the husband the wife took all
the property she had acquired by gift or inheritance, as
wel as the morning gift.
Summary. The did not inherit from each other,
each owned his own propetty, the wife co id convey nearly
as freely as the husband, they could nake gifts to each
other and the husband was not responsible for the wife'.s
torts nor crimes.
inhus far in the history of the English mnarriage l v
there appears nothing of the fictional unity. And Drom
this time on until the time of Littleton no tract (f it
can be found. Thcrfor we are left to speculation.
That it did noL find its way into the 1wj from any lin-
,oring notion of the patriarchal idea of the husband be-
ing Ithe center of all power in the family, seems to be ev
ident from the fnct that such ideas were long a,o left
out of the Anglo Saxon law. In the order of events in-
stead of returning to those ideas it should drift farther
from them. 'bhat the lorman were not the cause of this
seeming retrogression is equally 1nallowable. First, be-
cause the Anglo Saxon law was adopted nearly in toto by
(a)
William I. Second, they would have brought with them the
civil law if any and we have seen it did not exist there.
The true origin seems to me to have been Lhe teachings
of the Christian fathers. We have seen the loseeness of
the Roman marriage and history tells us thet the effect
upon the social life was extremely bad. Being a partner-
ship it was dissolved at pleasure and the home became a
mockery. The Christian fathers seeing these results
started out to reform the marriage relation. This re-
form beg .n in about the time of St Augustine. Working
independently of the civil law aril legislation, step by
(a) Reeve's Hist of the Cogi. Law,
st ,p they invested the !i-rriage with religious :;olemnity
and by the ninth century civil rid ecclesiastical ltw be-
(a)
carme one, tire former being wiped out. Influenced by what
they had seen of loose marriage 1-,s they went to the
other extreme. Yet their object was not to lower the
(b)
status of woman but to elev'te her. To do this they
thought as the bible says, thai husband and wife should
be one flesh and one blood. That they should become
one, having the same objects and the s-!iKe aims. This ve
see in the following, "Matrimony is the lewful order of
joinin together of Christian men and women by their as-
sent. And as of the Deity and humanity of Christ there
is made an indissoluble unity, so was matrimony, and ac-
cording to such unity ,vias such coupling found to be."(c)
So that we see that the marriage relation came under the
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts and impressed
(d)
with their laws. In Legrand v. Johnston, the court said
"Th - ecclesiastical courts according to th7 jurisdiction
of this country hove exclusive cognizance of the rights
and duties arising from the nrrriage state. Therefore I
(a) Phill. Eccl. Law, Vol. 1, 707.
(b) Women before the law, 22-24.
(c) Reeves, Vol. I., p. 311.
(d) Reeves, Vol. I, p. 311.;
(e) Legrand v. Johnston, 3 Ves. Jr. 35P.
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.3m completely at 2 loss to discover an equity to control
the comion law and admit a suti between husband and wife
upom a contract and supersede the exclusive jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical court by entering to the consider-
ation of it." Thus the theory of unity c5 n be traced
directly to the bible idea of marriage.
C H A P TE R II.
0-
Suits at Common Law and in Equity.
Owing to the unity in rerson of husband and wife
here could be no suit between them 't corrnnon law.
This seems to he ve been so evident as to prarctically be-
come a maxim. Yet there were other reasons than that
of thei unity but which in fact grew out of it . hus f
for an injury- to her person a wife coid not sue alone
but must secure her husband's concurrence and sue in
his narr. Blackstone says there -,as but one instance in
which the wife cr-uild sue in her own name, that was where
the husband abjured the realm. Thus we see it was impos-
sible for her to sue her husband. Again they thought if
the wife could be c ontinually suing the husband or the
husbar the wife, it would lead to great unhappiness in
the family. Such an idea was deemed to be entirely in-
comp atible with a corrmct notion of the Larried state.
However strin7gent and narrow the rule of law may
have been when we come to equity, we find one which in
coma '-rison, was extermelly broad. Here the wife may
(a) Longendyke v. Sane, 4" Barb. 367; Pitman v. Pit-
man, 4 Ore. 2'8.
maintain nearly any civil action against her husbtnd.(a)
Yet courts of Equity see3m to h: ve bcen imrressed that the
wife vas under the ptote-ction of 'he hvsb vnd ani cornpelmt
her to bring her nction by next frdend, who might be a
total stranger to her, although he was ,;enerally chozen
by the wife and musi always receive heraction before he
could act. The doctrine of unity seems never to have
prevailed in equity, or rather the c curts of eq-iity dis-
regarded the fiction and ,iaild r carry out ae n
I uQt crryoutagree nnts
or contracts between husband and wife when it was equi-
(b)
table and just for them to do so. The following are s orn
of the rrincipal instances in w ich it was possible for
husband and Wife to bring suits 'r-ai nst each other in eq-
a. Upon an agreement for separate maintenance enter-
ed into directly by him. Head v. Head,3Atk. 295; Guth v
Guth, 3 Brown's Cl. (17; Angler v. Angier, Prec. Ch. 497;
Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Ves. Ch. 44°2.
b. To compel specific rerformance of a contract en-
tered into before mad after v.aryriage. Sidney v. Sidney,
3 P. W. 264; Hendricks v. Isaacs, 117 1. Y. 441
(a) Coit v. Coit, 4 How. Pr. 232; Story's Eq. Pr.
-c. 61.
(b) v . Issacs, 117 'T. y. 441.
c. To restrain the husband from interfering 
with the
wife's separate estate, or if he has already interfered
to her detriment she may recover for such interference.
O'Brien v. Hilburn, 9 Tex. 297; Freethy v. Freethy, 42
Barb. 641.
d. To set aside conveyances made to the husband in
ignorance of her rights or which were 1,rocured by fraud.
Fry v- Fry, 7 Paige's Ch. 633; Lampert v. Lampert, 1 Ves.
21.
e. To obtain equitable allowances out of that part
of the husband's esthete derived from the wife. Catter v.
Carter, 1 Paige, 463; VanDeusen v. VanDeusen, 6 Paige,
366; Roberts v. Roberts, 2 Cox's Ch- 421.
f. To charge separate estate of the wife for money
borrowed from the husbarxn, Gardiner v. Gardiner, 22
Wend. 539; Alward v. Alward, 2 N. Y. Sup. 42; and where
the wife had fraudulently faken money belonging to her
husband andinvested it in real estate taking the title
in her own name it was held th-,t1 the husband could
maintain an action in equity to establish a trust in his
favor. Higgins v. Higgins, 14 Abb. N. C. 13.
g. To restrain the husband from reducing her chos-
es in action until he had made a suitable provision for
her. Wiles v. Wiles, 56 Am. Dec. 733; Fry v. 11y, 7
Paige, 461. This ismore especially true in caseswhwee he
must go into equity to reduce them to possession. Then
the ao urt would apply the raxim, "Ile who seeks equity
must do equity".
h. She may have an equitable action for conversion.
Davidson v. Smith, 20 Iovwa, 466,468; 44 Barb.
319.
i. To remove the husband from trusteeship of her
estate granted to him in trust and to recover property
fraudulently disposed of by him. Whitman v. Abernathy,
33 Ala. 154; also an action for ace unting where an es-
tate is held jointly by '.hem; Martin v. Martin, Hoffn.
(a)
462. In Purdy v. Walter where property was held in
trust by a third party for benefit of husband and wife,
and the trustee conveyed the title absolutely to the hus-
band, the court held that the wife couldnot only bring
an action in equity against her husband when si-a asked
relief with respect to her spparate property or for her
provision out of her separate property, but in all cases
where it is necessary to protect her rights.
(a) 48 Mo. 140.
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Conclusion. If the wife has separate property she
can bring any action in equity against her husband with
regard to it.
C H A P T E R III.
Suits iundcr New York Statutes.
A statute was passed in 1860 in 1860 authorizing
married women to sue and be sued the same as a feme sole
in all actions relating to her selarate property acquir-
ed by gift, purchase, devise or inheritance, also to
bt'ing an action in her own name to recover for an injury
to her pel-son or p'rperty and the proceeds of such action
to be part of her separate estate. By chapter 172, Laws
of 1862, this statute was reenacted with slight amendrent
which for our purtrose it is uniecessary to mention. Thiis
it reiiained until 1880, h-en bl,. chapter 245, sub. 38 it
was repealed. T1;e only I rovisions in the Code are Secs.
450, 1-roviding that, "In an action or special proceeding
a married woman al erars or prosecutes alone or joined
with other partise as if single and it is not proPer to
join the husband in such action." Also Sec. 1906, which
provides that in an action for slariier brought by a mar-
ried woman tI- damages recovered are part of her sepa-
r ?te property. And sec. 120., providing that 'j judgment
for or against a married woman shall be enforced the 
sam
as if she were single. So it would seem thal' since 1880
the right of a rnarrie I wrman to sue and be sued 
did not
exist. The question came up squarely in the case of 
Be
(a)
Bennett v. Bennett where the Court of Appeals, in a
lengthy and able opinion, decided that it wa:s not the in-
tention of the lagislature to abolish this right as is
evidenced by the Code provisions and the fact that in
chapter 245 of 18R0 they were merely getting rid of a
lot of useless statutes; so that at the present time
these Code provisions, together with Bennett v. Bennett
arc the basis of her right to sue an1 be sued. We have
now traced thelitigation which has arisen under the stat-
utes.
(b)
In 1870, in the case of Minier v. Minier, it was
held that the statute of 1862 gave the wife the same
right to sue her husband that it did to sue any other
person, but that the section giving her the right to sue
in her own name for injury to her person did not confer
upon her the power to sue her husband in tort, because
it was not to be presumed that the legislature intended
(a) 116 N. Y. 584.
(b) 4 Lansing, 421.
to thus open the dour to litigation over every little
quarrel which might arise between husbamd and wife. 'his
(2)
case was criticized in Perkins v. Perkins, which to a
large extent over-ruled it. Here i. was held that the
unity and oneness of husband and wife had not been de-
stroyhd by these chapters. The court said, "Ent by whom
may she be sued? By herself? of course notBy him who i.-
in oneness and unity with her, can be the one half of t
this united one sue !he other half by virtue of this stat
(b)
ate." Again in Alward v- Alward, it was held that there
could be no suit between husband and wife under these
statutes. The court discussed the decisions upon the
(c)
subject and said tha. the cases of Wood v. Wood, and
(d)
Wright v. Wright were mere dicta. Also that Howland
(e)
v. Howland holding that she might maintain an action of
(f)
replevin, Berdell v.*Parkhurst, hdlding +hat the wife
conld sue the husband for conversiob., and Granger v. Gran
(7,)
ger holding that she might sue him upon a promissory
(a) 7 Lasnisng, 19.
(b) 2 N. 7. Sup. 42.
(c) 86 N. Y. 575.
(d) 54 N. Y. 437.
(e) 20 Hun, 472.
(f) 19 Hun, 358.
(g) Z.N. Y. St. Rep. 211.
note under any and all circumstances had been over-ruled.
It is a notable fact, however that the court did not cite
the cases which over-ruled the one i:ientioned and we have
been unable to find them. In 1890 the ease of Alward v.
(a)
Alward was overthrown, and in Ryerson v. Ryerson, the
cases which it criticized were followed, it being held
that the wife could maintain an action against the hus-
(b)
band for conversion. A-ain in 1892, in Mason v. Mason,
there was a similar holding, and the ccurt cited with ap-
proval the cases of Berdell v. Parkhurst and Wood v. Wool
It had be-n also held that where the husband and wife
were tenants in cornnon Whe wife could bring an action for
(c)
partition. Thus we see that the lower courts in New
York have had a tendency to allow nearly any suit be-
tween the ma rital parties, and although the question <.as
not been decided by -.he court of Appeals since the cases
of Wood v. Wood and Wright v. Wright, it is very evident
that they will follow the dicta in those citations.
Unde-r the statute giving the wife the right to re-
cover in her own name for injuries to heP person consid-
(a) S N. Y. Sup. 738.
(b) 21 1,. Y. Sup. 206.
(c) Moore v. Moore, /17 N. Y. 4637; Vl.z 15
N; Y. Sup. 720. , - 1
erable litigation has arisen and, as has been said, the
court has universally held thaft she could not sue her
(a)
husband for such torts. In Freethy v. Freethy, it was
held that the wife could not bring an action against the
(b)
husband for her slander. And in Kujeck v. Goldman, that
he could not have an action of deceit. It was early de-
cided that the wife could not maintain an action against
the husband for assault and battery. Then the Q3neral
(c)
Term, in the case of Schultz v. Schultz, decided th- t
suich an action' could be rinintained, but on appeal it was
reversed.
Conclusion . Therc nay be suits between husband and
wife in New York at the Iresent 4ime in all civil actions
except personal injuries torts.
(a) 42 Barb. 641.
(b) 29 N. Y. Sup. 294.
(c) 27 Hun, 26, s. c. 89 N. Y. 644.
C H A P T 7 R IV.
Criminal Act ions.
On grounds of public policy a distinction is mide
between crimes against the person of the wife and crimes
against her propertly. The former being punishable and th
latter not. There appears to be no other reason for this
than that crimes against her person, as for example as-
sault, attract more attention and appear to society to
be barbarous and uncivilized, while the less outrageous
crime of larceny passes un-noticed. ThD reason thaft ther
there co1,l d be no larceny of each other's property,, will
be examined hereafter , but it semras that the same rea-
sons must exist in one instance that do in the other.
Assault and Batter_. Blackstone says that iinder the
old law the husband had the power of moderate chastisema
but that under the politer reign of Charles II. this
right came to be doubted, especially among the upper
(a)
classes, hut was still clung to among the lower classes.
(a)
Reeves states it nearly the same and adds that the hus-
band had the same power of correction over the wiile at
(a) Reeve's Dom. Rel. 92.
common law that he h:,d over his apprentice. Wharton also
agre's with the above, but Bishop says thal the power
of even moderate chastise mcnt has be-n questioned even
in England. All give as a reason for this power the fact
of the htisband',- liability for the wife's misconduct and
thal therefore he should have the right to control her.
Notwithstanding these authorities, the Hon. Irving Brown,
in an article in the American Law Review of 1891, after
a careful review of the cpsos laid down the following
proposition. "By te laws of England the husband never
had any right to chastise his vife for any cause except
self-defense". There are but few decisions in England
and these few have risen since the time of Charles II.,
but before his time it seems to me the pDower to chastise
at least existed, else so many statements similar to the
following could not have found their way into the text-
books and cases, e. g., the h'.sband may chastise with a
whip no larger than his thumb, or with a whip which could
be drawn through the wedding ring, etc.In fact it seems
entirely consistent with the times th-t such rights and
powers shoI'ld exist and be exercised. True it is that
in Lord Leigh's Case, 3 Keable, 433, decided in 22 Chas.
II. it was held that the right of even moderate chas-
tisemrent no longer existed in England. We will now con-
sider a few cases whi..h have arisen in America.
In Nurth Carolina the question first arose in the
Case of Stat? v. Rhodes, here the trial judge had charged
that the husband mighi. chastise his wife with a rod no
larger than his thumb. Om appeal the court held that i
this was not a proper standard but it shoil!d be the act-
ual amount of injury done, and that he might chastise her
to a moderate degree, giving for the same the reasons
Jiven by Blackstone. The question rose again in SAate v.
(b)
Mabrey, and it was held that -hile he had the right to
chastise moderately he did not have he right to flnurish
a knife a d threaten o kill her, and for such conduct
(c)
held him guilty of assault. Finally in State v. Oliver,
it uas held thatthe right to chastise the wife no longer
existed, but the court stated that it would not hear triv
ial complaints. Mississippi, in the case of Bradley v.
Stat4q)held that the husband could chastise with a whip
which could be drawn through the wedding ring. This for
the sarro -asons as are given by Blackstone, further that
(a) Phillip's Law (N. C.) 453.
(b) 64 N. C. 592.
(c) 70 ,. C. 60.
(d) Walker, 15 (Miss.)
it would be hetter a. low smel! wrongs to -'o unnotiaed
than btin- them ,o the public ,.z. Th,5 following St ats
have hold • i; t even the moderate right of chastisement
(s') (b) (0) (d)
did not exist. assachuzetts, Ohio, Texas, i.Iont, n*,
(0) (fM
New York, A..:Lbaia.
CoOton . Th- right of the }iisband to chastise.
the -rilft existed in ... rl. common 11.,w but not fter Chas.
II., it never existed in America, except in .Ii.,sissippi
and >.rrth Carolina.
Arson. At comon Lzu there is no doubt but that
not
the rife co.lld .e out_ arson in bvirnin the htsha,
(g) A
and's house. ',he 3-o for t qhis w.s theft they yteo'e one
and the possession of one ,vas the possession of the oth-
er and t hat at c',nmon law arson !.as deemed t o be an of-
fence n-,ainst the rossession rather hen a- inst the
(h)
p .e-n ty. The question nowv is, have ihe statutes ehang-
ed the la, so that. she wold b- uilty. In "o,,vYork thee
is no doubt but that she woild, no'.. however., becruse of
the mar'0c. women s statutes, bat tha 't-. the Pen,-1 Coda
rnvake.; ev'-n the burning of one's o-n dwelling arson.
(a) Comm. v. i cAffee, -. F.. t S *4- 410, P
(b) Pearman v. Pearnan, 1 Sway. & Twist, 601.
(c)for.n v. State, 41 lex. 221.
(d) Albert v, Albert, 5 Mon. 57G.
e) People v. Winters, 2 Park's Crim. L. 10i Poor v.
Poor, 2 Paige, 503.
(f) Fiwdgham v. itate, 46 Ala. 14;.
(g) Rex. v. hirsh, I Mood. C. C. 182.
(h) Peophe v. Vn Earoum, 2 John. 105.
The-question arose in Miehigan in 'he c-se of Snyder v.(a)
People, and under a statute which defined arson as the
burting of thi dwelling house of another ete., it was hea
hold theft it. was still a crire against the possession and
not the property and since the unity of husband and wife
had not be-n broken by th; :-arried women statutes, she
would not .be muilty. The courtsof InJiana, in the oases
(b) (0)
of Garrett v. State, and Emi7 v. Daum, under similar mar-
ried women statutes, held that arson w- an offence a-
gainst the property as well as possession, and there-
Por,. if the property belonged to the wife the husband
Would be guilty in burning it. Here the court did not
decide whther the mnity had been dissolved or not, but
simply said that it made no difference since it w#,as jn
offence against property and the statutes had given the
wife power to own and cntrol property as if snle.
barceny.. 'her. could b!- no larceny by husband and
(d)
wife of each other's roods at c nmon law. 1he reason
(a) 26 :ich, I05.
(b) 109 Ind. 527.
(c) Emig v. Daum, 27 ',. ,. .
(d) Rex v. Marsh, . /'
most genrilly tciven is their unity of rerson ani that
with iiarriage they endowed each other with the sort of
property in e ,h other's goods, but some declure it was
because th:, wife could not coymnit the trespass necessary
(a)
to constituLe larceny, Probably the whole thing grew
out of the , ction of tho unity. But in case the wife
comitted adultery and then took hci 'usband's goods, she
would be niilty of Iarceny. 'This was state d in Keg. v.
Op)
Featherstone, as follows, "Eut tiis rule, that they
couldrnot conait larceny, is properly and reasonably
qualified when she becomes an adulter ss. She thereby
determines her quality of wife and her property in her
husbond's groods ceases." The question of the larceny b;.
an ddulteress and an adulterer is very fully discussed in
(i). The case has never arisen in New York
State v. Eanks
as I have been able to find, but it seems that under the
cases that we have already discussed, the courtq of that
state would hold at- the present time that they would be
guilty. Yet since they have continually decided that the
(d)
unity had not been abolished, it is very difficult to
(a) 2 Bishop's Crim. Law, 872.
(b) 6 Cox C. C. 376.
(a) State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197.
(4) Bertels v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152.
decide just what they would do. Judge Codley in Snyder
v. People, said that under the statutes in Michigan there
could be no larceny. In Indiana, while the earlier de-
cisions hold there could not be, the late one of Beasley
(a)
v. State holds that there can. This was decided main-
ly upon the arson cases which had arisen in that state,
and because larceny was an injury to her propi'ty the
sameF as arson, so one should be a crime as much as the
other. Illinois and Texas hav- held that it would not
(b)
be larceny. The law on this subject is very uncertain
owing to the transition stat? of the statutes upon the
rights of married women.
( 38 N. E. 35.
(b) Thomas v. Thomas, 51 Ill. 162; Overton v. Stat?,
43 Tex. 616.

